Security model

What protects a sign-in

  1. Something the user has: the iPhone that linked. Each install creates a P-256 key in the Secure Enclave. The private key can't leave the phone; every call the app makes is signed with it, with a timestamp and a single-use nonce (replays are rejected).
  2. Something the user is: Face ID or the passcode before answering (policy Require Face ID).
  3. Proof they're looking at your sign-in: number matching. The phone offers three numbers; only the one on your page approves. A user who gets a request they didn't start can't approve it by reflex, and the wrong number is recorded as deny_reason: "number_mismatch".
  4. Anti push-bombing: at most 5 requests per user per minute, short expiry (30–300 s).

What your server must do

Verify the device signature

Optional, for end-to-end proof that doesn't rely on Trowyn's servers. approval-status returns response:

Check: SHA-256(line 7) equals line 6, the signature verifies over lines 1–6 joined with \n, the JSON's approval_id is yours and decision is approve.

What Trowyn stores and never stores

Stored: your organization's name and settings, member emails and roles, hashes of API keys and link codes, webhook URLs and (encrypted) signing secrets, each linked device's public key and push token, your external_user_id and label, approval requests and an audit log. See retention and the privacy policy.

Never sent to Trowyn: the user's one-time codes, authenticator secrets, passkeys or backups. Those never leave the phone (except to the user's own iCloud, encrypted). That includes backup codes you add to a link: the secret goes from your page to the phone inside the QR code only.

Platform

Report a vulnerability to support@miclikz.com with "SECURITY" in the subject.